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Random numbers have a variety of applications for which specific quality requirements must be
met. Perhaps the most demanding application is cryptography where the quality has a critical
impact on security. Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) based on the measurement of
quantum states promise perfectly unpredictable and private random numbers. However, all device
dependent QRNGs introduce assumptions that are either hardly justified or indeed unnecessary,
such as perfect purity of the states and no correlations between data samples. In this work we
experimentally realize a QRNG based on the measurement of vacuum fluctuations that does not
rely on these assumptions. Moreover, we demonstrate a real-time random number generation rate
of 8 GBit/s using a Toeplitz randomness extractor and certify the security of the random numbers
with a metrological approach based on system characterization. Our approach offers a number
of practical benefits and will therefore find widespread applications in quantum random number
generators. In particular our generated random numbers are well suited for today’s conventional
and quantum cryptographic solutions.
Random numbers are ubiquitous in modern society.
They are used in numerous applications ranging from
cryptography, simulations and gambling to fundamental
tests of physics. For most of these applications the qual-
ity of the random numbers is of utmost importance. If
for instance cryptographic keys originating from random
numbers are predictable, it will have severe consequences
for the security of the internet. To ensure the security of
cryptographic encryption, the random numbers must be
truly random, i.e. completely unpredictable to everyone
and thus private, and their randomness must be certi-
fied [1, 2].
True unpredictability and privacy of the generated
numbers can be attained through a quantum measure-
ment process: By performing a projective measurement
on a pure quantum state, and ensuring that the state is
not an eigenstate of the measurement projector, the out-
come is unpredictable and thus true random numbers can
be generated. Moreover, since a pure state cannot be cor-
related to any other state in the universe, the generated
numbers will be private. Certification gives the user a
guarantee that the produced random numbers are indeed
random. Since absolutely perfect randomness cannot be
produced, certification comes in the form of a small error
probability that describes how far the generated random
numbers are from an ideal condition.
Device independent (DI) QRNGs based on the vio-
lation of a Bell inequality yield the strongest random-
ness certification with the lowest number of assumptions.
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They are as of today, however, highly impractical in real
applications due to their high complexity and very low
speed: Currently tested DI-QRNGs are based on atom [3]
or photon entanglement [4, 5], and produce random num-
bers of about 10−5 and 1 bit/s, respectively. It is never-
theless possible to reduce the complexity of the system by
trading it with assumptions on the device [2, 6, 7]. An im-
portant task in developing a RNG is therefore to optimize
the trade-off between practicality (technical complexity
and speed) and reliability (randomness certification, un-
predictability and privacy).
Here, we consider a highly practical device depen-
dent system which is based on homodyne detection of
the (pure) quantum mechanical vacuum state. Such
a simple system is amongst one of the absolute front-
running QRNG technologies as it combines simplicity,
cost-effectiveness, chip-integrability and extraordinary
high speed. In comparison to previous implementations
of the QRNG based on homodyne detection of vacuum
fluctuations, we reduce the number of assumptions in the
security proof, in particular those that are not well jus-
tified by practical components. Our QRNG is therefore
perfectly suited for applications like classical and in par-
ticular quantum key distribution, which require the high-
est security guarantees and high speed [8].
There are four critical issues related to the perfor-
mance of device dependent QRNG which have not yet
been accounted for in a single implementation. Most of
the previous QRNGs have treated all information side-
channels as classical rather than quantum [9–19]. Only
by treating them quantum, the random numbers can
be secure against a quantum-enabled adversary. Re-
cently, this issue has been solved for a source-independent
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2QRNG [20, 21] which requires a more complex mea-
surement apparatus. Furthermore it has often been as-
sumed that measurements are uncorrelated in time [9–
19, 21], but, the finite bandwidth of any real detection
system introduces correlations which previously has only
be partially removed with (usually rate-reducing) post-
processing techniques. Most previous implementations
also do not use a conservative and rigorous approach – a
metrology-grade approach [22] – to determine the param-
eters relevant for extracting the amount of randomness
by accounting for imperfections and calibration uncer-
tainties. Finally, GBit-speed randomness extraction us-
ing an information theoretically secure randomness ex-
tractor has only been demonstrated recently [17–19, 23].
With our QRNG we solve all these aforementioned is-
sues simultaneously: We compute the lower bound on
the extractable quantum randomness by including the
possibility of an adversary extracting quantum informa-
tion via side-channels. We account for correlated sam-
ples resulting from the finite bandwidth of the measure-
ment apparatus. We perform a metrology-grade charac-
terization of the measuring homodyne detector system
to quantify their security. Finally, as a result, we pro-
duce random numbers in real-time with a rate of 8 Gbit/s
using a Toeplitz randomness extractor on a fast field-
programmable-gate-array (FPGA).
I. SETTING THE STAGE
A schematic of our QRNG is shown in Fig. 1. An arbi-
trary quadrature of the vacuum state is measured using
a balanced homodyne detector comprising a bright ref-
erence beam, a symmetric beam splitter and two photo-
diodes [24]. The measurement outcomes ideally are ran-
dom with a Gaussian distribution associated only with
the Gaussian Wigner function of the vacuum quantum
state [25]. The actual measured Gaussian distribution,
however, contains two additional independent Gaussian
noise sources; excess optical noise and electronic noise,
thereby contributing two side-channels. These must
be accounted for in estimating the min-entropy of the
source.
The amount of quantum randomness that can be ex-
tracted from the homodyne measurement of vacuum fluc-
tuations is given by the leftover hash lemma [26, 27]
` ≤ NHmin(X|E)− log 1
2hash
. (1)
Here Hmin(X|E) is the min-entropy of a single measure-
ment outcome drawn from a random variable X condi-
tioned on the quantum side-information E held by an ad-
versary, N is the number of aggregated samples and hash
is the distance between a perfectly uniform random string
and the string produced by a randomness extractor. It
is therefore clear that we need to find the min-entropy
of our practical – thus imperfect – realization in order to
bound the amount of randomness. We achieve this in a
two-step approach: First we theoretically derive a bound
for the min-entropy using a realistic security model and
express it in terms of experimentally accessible parame-
ters. Next, we experimentally deduce these parameters
through a metrology-grade characterization [22]. Using
such an approach we find the worst-case min-entropy
compatible with the confidence intervals of our character-
ization and calibration measurements, thereby obtaining
a string of -random bits that are trustworthy with the
same level of confidence.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security analysis of the QRNG is made under the
assumption that the quantum noise is Gaussian and sta-
tionary. Therefore, the QRNG is device-dependent, i.e.
an adversary cannot change the system after system char-
acterization has been performed. Stationarity is formally
expressed by a Wigner function that takes the form of a
stationary Gaussian distribution in phase-space. As we
are dealing with Gaussian states, the Wigner function
is completely characterized by the first and second mo-
ments of the field quadratures.
In our analysis we assume that homodyne detection is
defined on a single optical mode, which at a given time is
characterized by the field quadratures qˆ and pˆ. We also
make a further assumption that the state is symmetric
under a rotation of the quadratures
qˆ → qˆ cos θ + pˆ sin θ , (2)
pˆ→ pˆ cos θ − qˆ sin θ , (3)
for all θ ∈ (0, 2pi).
In the Sections, we first assess the security of the case
of a source emitting i.i.d. (independent and identically
distributed) signals, i.e., a source of infinite bandwidth.
We then extend the security analysis to a source with
finite bandwidth that emits correlated signals at different
times corresponding to non-i.i.d. samples.
A. IID limit
First consider an ideal i.i.d. scenario with unlimited
bandwidth. As explained above, we assume that the
source emits a Gaussian state of light that is symmet-
ric in phase space. In the i.i.d. limit this corresponds to
a source of thermal light. We therefore assume a thermal
source emitting n mean photons per mode. Each mode
is measured independently by homodyne detection.
For a thermal state the first moments of the field
quadratures vanish, and the covariance matrix (CM) is
Vthermal =
( 〈qˆ2〉 12 〈qˆpˆ+ pˆqˆ〉
1
2 〈pˆqˆ + qˆpˆ〉 〈pˆ2〉
)
(4)
=
(
1 + 2n 0
0 1 + 2n
)
, (5)
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the QRNG. A 1.6 mW 1550 nm laser beam was split into two by a 3 dB fiber coupler and detected by a
home-made homodyne detector based on a MAR-6 microwave amplifier from Minicircuits and two 120µm InGaAs photo diodes
(PD). The output of the detector was amplified with a microwave amplifier, lowpass filtered at 400 MHz and digitized with a
16 bit 1 GSample/s analog-to-digital (ADC) converter. The ADC was read out by a Xilinx Kintex UltraScale FPGA. ADC
and FPGA were hosted by a PCI Express card from 4DSP (Abaco). The FPGA was used for real-time randomness extraction
based on Toeplitz hashing. Fifo: First-in-first-out buffer.
where we, as a matter of convention, put the variance of
the vacuum equal to 1.
For such a state, the output X of ideal homodyne de-
tection is a continuous (real-valued) variable whose prob-
ability distribution is
pX(x) = G(x; 0, g
2(1 + 2n)) , (6)
where g is a gain factor and
G(x;µ, v2) =
1√
2piv
e−
(x−µ)2
2v2 (7)
denotes a Gaussian in the variable x, with mean µ and
variance v2.
To account for quantum side information we assume
that a malicious adversary holds a purification of the
thermal state emitted by the source. It is well known
that the purification of a thermal state can be assumed,
without loss of generality, to be a two-mode squeezed
vacuum (TMSV) state. Thereby one optical mode of
this TMSV state, characterized by the field quadratures
qˆe and pˆe is controlled by the adversary. The TMSV
state is a Gaussian state with zero mean and covariance
matrix [25]
V =

〈qˆ2〉 12 〈qˆpˆ+ pˆqˆ〉 〈qˆqˆe〉 〈qˆpˆe〉
1
2 〈pˆqˆ + qˆpˆ〉 〈pˆ2〉 〈pˆqˆe〉 〈pˆpˆe〉〈qˆeqˆ〉 〈qˆepˆ〉 〈qˆ2e〉 12 〈qˆepˆe + pˆeqˆe〉〈pˆeqˆ〉 〈pˆepˆ〉 12 〈pˆeqˆe + qˆepˆe〉 〈pˆ2e〉
 (8)
=

1 + 2n 0 2
√
n(n+ 1) 0
0 1 + 2n 0 −2√n(n+ 1)
2
√
n(n+ 1) 0 1 + 2n 0
0 −2√n(n+ 1) 0 1 + 2n
 . (9)
The correlations between the outcome X of ideal ho-
modyne detection and the quantum side information
held by the eavesdropper are described by the classical-
quantum (CQ) state
ρXE =
∫
dx pX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE , (10)
where |x〉 are orthogonal states used to represent the pos-
sible outcomes of homodyne detection, and the integral
in Eq. (10) extends over the real line. The state ρxE is
the conditional state of the eavesdropper for a given mea-
surement output value x. Assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that the quadrautre qˆ is measured. It is then
straightforward to compute the first moment of the field
quadratures of ρxE :( 〈qˆe〉
〈pˆe〉
)
=
(
2
√
n(n+1)
g(1+2n) x
0
)
, (11)
as well as the CM( 〈qˆ2e〉 12 〈qˆepˆe + pˆeqˆe〉
1
2 〈pˆeqˆe + qˆepˆe〉 〈pˆ2e〉
)
=
(
1
1+2n 0
0 1 + 2n
)
.
(12)
In our QRNG the continuous variable X is mapped
into a discrete and bounded variable X¯ due to the use
of an analog-to-digital converter (ADC). We therefore
consider a model in which X is replaced by a discrete
4variable X¯ such that
pX¯(k) =
∫
Ik
dxpX(x) , (13)
where Ik’s are d intervals that discretize the outcome of
homodyne detection. In a typical setting these d non-
overlapping intervals Ik are of the form
I1 = (−∞,−R] , (14)
Id = (R,∞) , (15)
and for k = 2, . . . , d− 1
Ik = (ak −∆x/2, ak + ∆x/2] , (16)
with ak = −R + (k − 1)∆x/2 and ∆x = 2R/(d − 2).
This choice of the intervals reflects the way in which an
ADC with range R and bin size ∆x operates in mapping
a continuous variable into a discrete one, however, we do
not account for digitization errors [22] which is left for
future work.
In terms of the discrete variable X¯, the correlations
with the eavesdropper are then described by the state
ρX¯E =
∑
k
pX¯(k)|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρ(k)E , (17)
with
ρ
(k)
E =
1
pX¯(k)
∫
Ik
dxpX(x)ρ
x
E . (18)
We are now ready to quantify the secure rate of the
QRNG in terms of the conditional min-entropy. Given
the state ρX¯E in Eq. (17), the min-entropy of X¯ condi-
tioned on the eavesdropper (denoted with the letter E)
reads [28] [29]
Hmin(X¯|E)ρ = sup
γ
[
− log ‖γ−1/2E ρX¯E γ−1/2E ‖∞
]
. (19)
Note that the supremum is over all density operators
γ. Therefore, a first lower bound on the min-entropy is
obtained by computing ‖γ−1/2E ρX¯E γ−1/2E ‖∞ for a given
choice of the state γ:
Hmin(X¯|E)ρ ≥ − log ‖γ−1/2E ρX¯E γ−1/2E ‖∞ (20)
= − log
[
sup
k
pX¯(k) ‖γ−1/2E ρ(k)E γ−1/2E ‖∞
]
,
(21)
where the last equality holds because the eigenstates |k〉
of ρX¯E in Eq. (17) are mutually orthogonal. Here we set
γ equal to a Gaussian state with zero mean and CM(
1 + 2(n+ δ) 0
0 1 + 2(n+ δ)
)
, (22)
where the parameter δ will be optimized a posteriori to
make the bound as tight as possible.
A second lower bound is obtained by applying the tri-
angular inequality,
pX¯(k) ‖γ−1/2E ρ(k)E γ−1/2E ‖∞
= ‖γ−1/2E
∫
Ik
dx pX(x) ρ
x
Eγ
−1/2
E ‖∞ (23)
≤
∫
Ik
dx pX(x) ‖γ−1/2E ρxE γ−1/2E ‖∞ , (24)
which implies
Hmin(X¯|E) ≥ − log
[
sup
k
∫
Ik
dx pX(x) ‖γ−1/2E ρxE γ−1/2E ‖∞
]
.
(25)
Note that ρxE and γE are both Gaussian states and
therefore the above lower bound can be computed us-
ing the Gibbs-representation techniques developed in
Ref. [30] and the techniques of [8] for the relative en-
tropy between two arbitrary Gaussian states. These ear-
lier methods can be used to derive a formula for the Re´nyi
relative entropy (see Theorem 5 of Ref. [31]). By apply-
ing this formula we obtain
∫
Ik
dx pX(x) ‖γ−1/2E ρxEγ−1/2E ‖∞ =
1
g
(n+ δ)(1 + n+ δ)√
2piδ(2n(n+ 1 + δ) + δ)
∫
Ik
dx exp
[−x2
2g2
δ
2n(n+ 1 + δ) + δ
]
. (26)
The supremum over k can be computed for any given collection of intervals Ik’s. For intervals as in Eqs. (14)-(16)
we obtain
Hmin(X¯|E) ≥ − log
[
(n+ δ)(1 + n+ δ)
δ
max
{
erf
(√
δ
4n(n+ 1 + δ) + 2δ
∆x
2g
)
,
1
2
erfc
(√
δ
4n(n+ 1 + δ) + 2δ
R
g
)}]
.
(27)
We remark that this is in fact a family of lower bounds parameterized by δ. One should then find the optimal value
of δ for which the bound is tighter.
So far we have considered quantum noise, which was quantified by the mean photon number n. If the variance
also includes an additive term ζ due to classical noise, v2 = g2(1 + 2n) + ζ2, then this can be included in the above
5analysis by treating it as quantum noise and re-defining n→ n+ ζ22g2 .
B. Beyond IID: stationary Gaussian process
Going beyond i.i.d., we now consider a more realistic
scenario where the measured signal has a finite band-
width. In this section we first build an i.i.d. model for
the non-i.i.d. process. Then we apply the results of Sec-
tion II A to compute a lower bound on the min-entropy
with quantum side information.
The analysis deals with two processes. One is the sig-
nal X, i.e. the homodyne measurement of the quantum
state including all additive noise processes. The second
is the excess noise U , i.e. all noise sources present in the
measurement apart from the pure vacuum fluctuations,
for instance electronic noise of the detector and intensity
noise of the local oscillator laser. When a measurement
is performed at a given time t, the measured signal is de-
noted Xt. Similarly, we denote as Ut the excess noise at
time t (we need this as a theoretical tool, even though this
quantity is not accessible experimentally). We assume
that both X and U are stationary Gaussian processes.
Let us first consider the output X of ideal homodyne
detection, and denote as σ2 its variance. From the power
spectrum fX(λ) we can estimate the entropy rate of the
signal [32]
h(X) =
1
2
log (2pieσ2X) , (28)
where
σ2X =
1
2pie
2
∫ 2pi
0
dλ
2pi log[2piefX(λ)] (29)
is the conditional variance. Note that, unless the signal is
i.i.d., σ2X is strictly smaller than the signal variance σ
2.
Similarly, from the power spectrum of the excess noise
fU (λ) we obtain the entropy rate of the noise
h(U) =
1
2
log (2pieσ2U ) , (30)
where
σ2U =
1
2pie
2
∫ 2pi
0
dλ
2pi log[2piefU (λ)] (31)
is the conditional variance of the excess noise.
Because of the finite bandwidth of the measuring ap-
paratus, both the signal Xt and excess noise Ut at a given
time t are correlated with their values at previous times.
To filter out the effects of these correlations we consider
the probability density distribution of Xt conditioned on
all past signal values,
pXt(xt|x<t) = G(xt;µt, σ2X) , (32)
where xt denotes the possible values of the variable Xt at
time t, x<t denotes the collection of values of all signals
at times t′ < t, and µt is the mean value. Note that
µt depends on x<t, whereas the conditional variance σ
2
X
does not depend on time. This description is consistent
with the assumption of a stationary Gaussian process
[32]. By definition, the conditioned variable at time t is
independent on previous signal values. Therefore, we can
model it as an outcome from an i.i.d. measurement of a
quantum state with the same variance and identify (with
the notation of the Section II A):
σ2X ≡ g2(1 + 2n) . (33)
We can then write the (unconditional) signal variance σ2
as
σ2 = g2(1 + 2n) + ζ , (34)
where ζ = σ2−σ2X . The term ζ is interpreted as classical
noise due to the fact that the mean value µt is itself a
Gaussian random variable, whose variance is in fact ζ.
In summary, we have defined an effective i.i.d. model
for the non-i.i.d. signal. This i.i.d. model has been ob-
tained using the notion of conditional variance. The i.i.d.
model is defined when the parameters n and g are spec-
ified. Therefore, we need a second equation in addition
to Eq. (34) to determine the model parameters n and g
as function of the measured quantities σ2, σ2X , and σ
2
U .
This is obtained through the conditional variance of the
excess noise.
For the excess noise Ut we can similarly write the prob-
ability density distribution conditioned on past values,
i.e.,
pUt(ut|u<t) = G(ut; νt, σ2U ) , (35)
where ut denotes the possible values of the variable Ut
at time t, u<t denotes its past values, and νt is the mean
value of Ut. The quantity of interest is the conditional
excess noise variance σ2U , which represents the variance of
the excess noise that is virtually independent of previous
noise values. We identify this variance with the variance
of the excess noise in the i.i.d. model of Section II A:
σ2U ≡ 2g2n . (36)
Endowed with Eq. (34) and (36), we are now in the
position of determining the parameters n and g of the
i.i.d. model of the non-i.i.d. process. Solving for n and g
the coupled equations,
σ2X = g
2(1 + 2n) , (37)
σ2U = 2g
2n , (38)
we obtain
g =
√
σ2X − σ2U , (39)
n =
1
2
σ2U
σ2X − σ2U
. (40)
6Finally, we need to account for the classical noise vari-
ance ζ. As discussed in Section II A, we incorporate it in
the quantum noise by re-defining
n→ n+ ζ
2g2
(41)
=
1
2
σ2U
σ2X − σ2U
+
1
2
σ2 − σ2X
σ2X − σ2U
(42)
=
1
2
σ2
σ2X − σ2U
− 1
2
. (43)
In conclusion, the model allows us to compute a lower
bound for the min-entropy of the non-i.i.d. process by
inserting the above values for g [in Eq. (39)] and n [in
Eq. (43)] in the min-entropy formula of Eq. (27). This
is plotted in Fig. 2 for varying excess noise, ADC resolu-
tion and temporal correlations. The x-axis of the plot is
the ratio of the conditional variance of the vacuum fluc-
tuations and the excess noise, i.e. the quantum noise to
excess noise ratio of the virtual i.i.d. process. Assum-
ing that the measured homodyne signal and the excess
noise have similar temporal correlations, this ratio is in-
dependent of the amount of correlations. The amount
of correlations present in the system is instead charac-
terized by the ratio σ2X/σ
2 which takes the value of 1
for an i.i.d. process and becomes smaller for increasing
temporal correlations. For each ADC resolution the up-
per traces in the figure show the extractable min-entropy
when almost no correlations are present.
Similar to the result for classical side-information [13],
we show that random numbers can be generated for noise
treated as quantum side-information as well; and even in
the large excess noise regimes, if the ADC bit resolution
is sufficiently high. This property is preserved even when
a large amount of temporal correlations is present in the
recorded data (lower traces). The role of the high bit res-
olution is thereby that even if a small amount of vacuum
fluctuations are present, they have a profound impact on
whether the measured signal falls into one or the other
ADC bin, a property that is independent of temporal
correlations.
III. SYSTEM CHARACTERIZATION
Using the above results, we are now in a position to es-
timate the min-entropy through a metrology-grade char-
acterization of our setup. According to the security anal-
ysis, the min-entropy can be found by determining the
variance σ2 as well as the conditional variances of the
homodyne signal σ2X and the excess noise σ
2
U . To obtain
a conservative, and thus reliable, estimate of the min-
entropy, it is important that the determination of these
parameters does not rely on any ideality assumptions of
the homodyne detector. In previous studies on homodyne
based QRNG, the sole presence of shot noise has been
verified by characterizing its scaling with optical power.
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FIG. 2. Min-entropy for 8, 12 and 16 bit ADC resolution
versus the ratio of conditional variance of the vacuum fluc-
tuations and the conditional variance of the excess noise,
(σ2X − σ2U )/σ2U . The shaded areas indicate the regions be-
tween low correlations (σ2X/σ
2 = 0.99), upper trace, and high
correlations (σ2X/σ
2 = 0.1), lower trace. The signal variance
has been optimized to obtain the highest min-entropy.
However, imperfect common-mode rejection, large inten-
sity noise of the laser or stray light coupling into the
signal port – likely to be an issue with integrated pho-
tonic chips – may unnecessarily constrain the extraction
of random numbers. Furthermore this characterization
method is not directly compatible with metrology-grade
characterization as it is difficult to bound the estimation
error on the shot noise level with a confidence interval.
To circumvent these assumptions and issues we perform
an independent, reliable and metrology-grade character-
ization of the measuring device.
We basically consider the homodyne detector as a box
with an input and an output with minimal assumptions
on its internal workings (see Fig 3a). Our strategy is thus
to measure the transfer function of the box and to use
this result to conservatively calibrate the power spectral
density (PSD) of the vacuum fluctuations. This conser-
vatively estimated result is then compared to the PSD of
an actual noise measurement from which we deduce the
conditional variances of the signal noise and the excess
noise, and finally the min-entropy.
The transfer function of the box is measured by in-
jecting a coherent state in form of a second laser beam
(independent of the local oscillator laser) with low power
Psig into the signal port of the beam splitter as displayed
in Fig. 3a. A typical beat signal is shown in Fig. 3b ob-
tained by computing an averaged periodogram from the
sampled signal. We record the transfer function TF(ν) by
scanning the frequency of the signal laser. At each differ-
ence frequency ν we determine the power of the beat sig-
nal and normalize it to Psig. At high signal-to-noise ratio
the root-mean-square power of the beat signal is purely
a function of the coherent state amplitude (i.e. the signal
laser power) and independent of the noise properties of
the two lasers and the detector.
The transfer function includes the efficiency of the in-
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FIG. 3. Characterization of the transfer function of the detection system to obtain the vacuum fluctuations noise level.
a) Experimental setup for the characterization. b) Power spectrum from a typical measurement. The transfer function is
determined by the amplitude of the beat node. c) Transfer function of the homodyne detector and the electronics including
the analog-to-digital converter. Inset: Transfer function with linear frequency scale.
terference, optical loss and the quantum efficiency of the
photodiodes, as well as the frequency dependent gain of
all amplifiers, the lowpass filter and the analog band-
width of the ADC. Since the vacuum noise was amplified
to optimally fill the range of the ADC we used a 20 dB
electrical attenuator with flat attenuation over the fre-
quency band of interest to avoid saturation, see Fig. 3a.
The result of the transfer function characterization, nor-
malized to a maximum gain of 1 is shown in Fig. 3c. As-
suming linearity of the detector we obtain the PSD of the
vacuum fluctuations by multiplying the transfer function
TF(ν) with the shot noise energy ~ωL contained in 1 Hz
bandwidth, where ~ is Planck’s constant and ωL is the
angular frequency of the local oscillator laser. By mod-
elling the inner workings of the grey box we confirm in
the supplementary material that using this procedure we
indeed obtain a lower bound on the PSD of the vacuum
fluctuations.
The conservatively estimated PSD of the vacuum fluc-
tuations is shown in Fig. 4a together with the actually
measured PSD of the signal. The spectra are clearly
“colored” which indicates that the data samples are cor-
related and therefore non-i.i.d. This is further corrobo-
rated in Fig. 4b, where the autocorrelation of the signal
is plotted. It justifies the importance of using the min-
entropy relation associated with non-i.i.d. samples.
From the PSDs we calculate the three parameters for
obtaining the min-entropy which are summarized in Ta-
ble I. Minimizing the min-entropy over the confidence set
of the estimated parameters, yielded 10.7 bit per 16 bit
sample for a failure probability of our parameter charac-
Parameter Mean Confidence interval
σ2 3.96× 107 0.09× 107
σ2X 3.29× 107 0.07× 107
σ2U 2.49× 107 0.06× 107
Conditional quantum to
excess noise ratio -4.9 dB
Temporal correlations σ2X/σ
2 0.83
Min-entropy 10.7 bit
Calculated secure length 640.7 bit
Extracted length 640 bit
TABLE I. Summary of parameters determined by the metro-
logical characterization with their confidence intervals for
PE = 10
−10: signal variance σ2, conditional signal variance
σ2X and conditional excess noise variance σ
2
U . The calculated
min-entropy minimized over the confidence intervals, the se-
cure length according to the leftover hash lemma and the
length of the extracted random sequence in the experiment.
terization of PE = 10
−10 (i.e. the probability that the
actual parameters are outside the confidence intervals).
To verify the Gaussian assumption in our security proof
we calculated the probability quantiles of the measured
samples and compared those to the theoretical quantiles
of a Gaussian distribution, see Fig. 4c.
IV. REAL-TIME RANDOMNESS EXTRACTION
Having calculated the min-entropy, the next step is to
extract random numbers. This is done by using a strong
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FIG. 4. Experimental results. a) The figure shows the power spectral densities of the signal, the calibrated vacuum fluctuations
(obtained by the characterization) and the excess noise (obtained by subtracting the PSD of the vacuum fluctuations from
the PSD of the signal. b) Autocorrelation coefficients calculated from the measured samples and averaged 1000 times. The
inset shows a zoom. c) Q-Q plot indicating the Gaussianity of the measured samples. The variance of the samples has been
normalized to 1. The limited ADC range truncates the tails of the Gaussian distribution which results in slight deviations from
the theoretical quantiles towards the ends.
extractor based on a Toeplitz matrix hashing algorithm
in which the seed can be reused [17, 23, 33]. We chose
matrix dimensions of n = 1280 bits and m = 640 bits,
corresponding to 80 input samples with a depth of 16 bit
and an output length m < ` chosen as a multiple of
128 bit such that Eq. 1 was fulfilled with Hmin = 10.7 bit
and hash < 10
−33. The recorded samples from the ADC
were transferred into a first-in-first-out (FIFO) buffer in
the FPGA using a 64 bit wide bus with a clock frequency
of 250 MHz. The randomness extraction was then im-
plemented with a clock rate of 125 MHz and processed
128 bit words at once: We sliced the full Toeplitz matrix
column-wise into sub-matrices of (column) size 128. In
each pipeline stage the 128 bit input vector was multi-
plied with the n row-vectors of a sub-matrix in parallel.
The seed of n+m− 1 bits was kept in fast FPGA logic
flip-flops and the sub-matrices were generated on the fly
due to limited logic resources. The multiplication was
performed using bit-wise AND and a subsequent XOR of
all 128 bits which was implemented in a 3-stage pipeline
to fulfill timing constraints. The resulting m bits were
stored in an accumulator register. The achieved through-
put was 8 GBit/s.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have demonstrated a QRNG based
on the measurement of vacuum fluctuations with a real-
time extraction at a rate of 8 GBit/s. Our QRNG has
a strong security guarantee with a failure probability of
N ′ · hash + PE + seed = N ′ ·10−33 + 10−10 + seed, where
N ′ is the number of QRNG runs in the past, hash is the
security parameter related to the removal of side infor-
mation (see Eq. 1) PE = 10
−10 is the security parameter
of the metrological grade parameter estimation and seed
describes the security of the random bits used for seeding
the randomness extractor. Since an adversary may have
access to all quantum side information from the past,
hash grows with time [1]. We chose a value of 10
−33
to be able to generate Gaussian random numbers with
security  = 2 × 10−10 for a QKD run with 1010 sam-
ples requiring reseeding of the QRNG only once every 10
years. In our experiment the seed bits were chosen with
a pseudo-random number generator, which did not allow
us to give a security guarantee for seed. The generated
random numbers passed both, the dieharder [34] and the
NIST [35] statistical batteries of randomness tests.
The real-time speed of our QRNG was limited to 8
GBit/s due to the small input size of the Toeplitz ex-
tractor required by our FPGA implementation. With a
5 times larger input size, a throughput of more than 10
GBit/s would be possible with the same security parame-
ter. While for our implementation a larger input size led
to unmanageable FPGA code compile times, it might be
possible to achieve with a recently demonstrated FPGA
implementation based on a new algorithm which requires
less computing resources [19].
Nevertheless, our QRNG is perfectly suited for use in
high-speed QKD links, for instance in GHz clocked dis-
crete variable [36] as well as in high-speed continuous-
variable QKD [37]. For Gaussian-modulated CVQKD
the uniform random number distribution has to be con-
verted to a Gaussian distribution which requires a larger
random number generation rate. Furthermore, QKD re-
quires quantified security and a guarantee of privacy of
the random numbers as provided by our system.
Further developments to guarantee reliable operation
over a long time and to fulfill requirements by certifica-
tion authorities would need to include power-on self-tests
and online testing of the parameters in the security proof
as well as the generated random numbers.
9ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors acknowledge support from the Innovation
Fund Denmark through the Quantum Innovation Center,
Qubiz. TG, AK, DSN, NJ and ULA acknowledge support
from the Danish National Research Foundation, Center
for Macroscopic Quantum States (bigQ, DNRF142). TG,
NJ, SP and ULA acknowledge the EU project CiViQ
(grant agreement no. 820466). The authors thank Al-
berto Nannarelli for valuable discussions.
Appendix A: Supplementary Material
Appendix B: Comparison with classical side information
In this Section we compare our lower bound on the min-entropy with quantum side information with an upper
bound obtained under the assumption that the eavesdropper performs ideal homodyne detection.
In the main body of the paper we have obtained the following lower bound on the min-entropy with quantum side
information:
Hmin(X¯|E) ≥ − log
[
(n+ δ)(1 + n+ δ)
δ
max
{
erf
(√
δ
4n(n+ 1 + δ) + 2δ
∆x
2g
)
,
1
2
erfc
(√
δ
4n(n+ 1 + δ) + 2δ
R
g
)}]
.
(B1)
For the sake of comparison, we simplify this expression by using an optimal choice for the ADC range R. This
yields
Hmin(X¯|E)ρ ≥ − log
[
(n+ δ)(1 + n+ δ)
δ
erf
(√
δ
4n(n+ 1 + δ) + 2δ
∆x
2g
)]
. (B2)
At the lowest order in ∆x this in turn becomes
Hmin(X¯|E)ρ & − log
(
∆x
g
)
− log
(
(n+ δ)(1 + n+ δ)√
2piδ2n(n+ 1 + δ) + δ]
)
. (B3)
This bound can be made tighter by using an optimal value for δ. For example, putting δ = n we obtain
Hmin(X¯|E)ρ & − log
(
∆x
g
)
− log
( √
2(2n+ 1)√
pi(4n+ 3)
)
. (B4)
Let us now compute an upper bound for an eavesdropper measuring by homodyne detection. If user and eaves-
dropper both apply homodyne detection, then they generate a pair of correlated Gaussian variables X and Y such
that
pY (y) = G(y; 0, 1 + 2n) , (B5)
pX(x|y) = G
(
x;
2g
√
n(n+ 1)
1 + 2n
y,
g2
1 + 2n
)
. (B6)
The variable X is then mapped into a discrete and bounded variable X¯ as described in the main body of the paper.
Using an optimal choice of the range R of the ADC, the min-entropy of X¯ conditioned on the Y is
Hmin(X¯|C) = − log erf
(
∆x
g
√
2 + 4n
4
)
, (B7)
or, up to correction of order higher than ∆x,
Hmin(Xˆ|C) ' − log
(
∆x
g
)
− log
(√
1 + 2n
2pi
)
. (B8)
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Figure 5 shows, for ∆x = n/1000, the homodyne upper bound in Eq. (B7) and the min-entropy lower bound in Eq.
(B4), as function of the mean photon number n. The latter is plotted for δ = n. Figure 6 shows instead the difference
between the lower bound in Eq. (B4) and the homodyne upper bound in Eq. (B8), again for δ = n (notice that the
difference is independent of ∆x). This plots whow that our lower bound is tight and in fact homodyne is close to
be the optimal measurement for Eve. Note that the difference between the upper and lower bounds is as small as a
fraction of a bit.
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n
10
12
14
16
Hmin
FIG. 5. Homodyne upper bound Hmin(X¯|C) as in Eq. (B7) [red line] and the min-entropy lower bound in Eq. (B4), vs the
mean photon number n, for δ = n and ∆x = n/1000.
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FIG. 6. The difference between the Homodyne upper bound in Eq. (B8) and the min-entropy lower bound in Eq. (B4), vs the
mean photon number n, for δ = n.
Appendix C: Estimation of variances and the entropy rate
In this appendix we discuss the estimation of the variance, entropy rate and conditional variance of the noise and
signal. To make things more concrete, we focus on the estimation of the signal variance σ2, entropy rate h(X) and
the conditional signal variance σ2X . Assume that T is the runtime of the experiment, and n signal measurements are
performed at regular time intervals of δt = T/n. The spectral density computed from these data is a function of
n discrete frequencies, denoted as ωj ’s, taking values between 2pi/T and 2pin/T . Below we work with the discrete
variable λj defined as λj ≡ Tωj/n, which can be approximated by the continuous variable λ taking values with
domain [0, 2pi].
We estimate the spectral density f(λ) by applying the Welch’s method, according to which the data are first divided
in M (possibly overlapping) blocks, and then in each block the periodogram is computed, i.e., the discrete Fourier
transform of the data contained in that very block. The spectral density is then estimated by taking the average
over the periodograms. We assume that the periodograms, as random variables, are independent and identically
distributed, and that each periodogram is distributed as the square of a Gaussian variable. Then the Welch’s estimate
of the spectral density is distributed as a (rescaled) χ2(k) variable with M degrees of freedom. Denoting as f0(λj)
the Welch’s estimate for the spectral density and as f(λj) its real value, then we can obtain a confidence interval by
11
applying a tail bound of a χ2(k) variable. For example we can exploit the tail bounds (see e.g. [38])
Pr
{
f(λj) <
f0(λj)
1 + t
}
≤ e−Mt2/8 , (C1)
Pr
{
f(λj) >
f0(λj)
1− t
}
≤ e−Mt2/8 . (C2)
For t 1 this yields, up to higher order terms,
Pr {f(λj) 6∈ [(1− t)f0(λj), (1 + t)f0(λj)]} = P (t) (C3)
with
P (t) ≤ 2 e−Mt2/8 . (C4)
Let us first discuss the estimation of the entropy rate
h(X) =
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
dλ
2pi
log [2pief(λ)] , (C5)
as approximated by the finite sum
h(X) ' 1
2
n∑
j=1
1
n
log [2pief(λj)] . (C6)
For each given j, 1 − P (t) is the probability that f(λj) ∈ [(1 − t)f0(λj), (1 + t)f0(λj)], then it follows (from an
application of the union bound) that
Pr {∃j | f(λj) 6∈ [(1− t)f0(λj), (1 + t)f0(λj)]} ≤ nP (t) . (C7)
This is equivalent to say that, with probability larger than 1−nP (t), f(λj) lays between (1−t)f0(λj) and (1+t)f0(λj)
for all j = 1, . . . , n. Therefore
h(X) ∈
1
2
n∑
j=1
1
n
log [2pief0(λj)] +
1
2
log (1− t), 1
2
n∑
j=1
1
n
log [2pief0(λj)] +
1
2
log (1 + t)
 (C8)
with probability at least equal to 1 − nP (t) = 1 − 2ne−Mt2/8. A further linear approximation for t  1 yields the
confidence interval
h(X) ∈
1
2
n∑
j=1
1
n
log [2pief0(λj)]− log e
2
t,
1
2
n∑
j=1
1
n
log [2pief0(λj)] +
log e
2
t
 . (C9)
Finally, to take into account the overlap between adjacent periodograms, we replace M → γM , for γ < 1. For
example, if the periodogram have a 50% overlap we put γ = 1/2. In conclusion, with an overlap of 50%, we obtain
that for any given  > 0, the entropy rate lies within the interval
h(X) ' 1
2
n∑
j=1
1
n
log [2pief0(λj)]± 2 log e
√
1
M
ln
(
2n

)
, (C10)
up to a probability not larger than .
From the entropy rate we obtain a confidence interval for the conditional variance, σX ∈ [σ−X , σ+X ], where
σ±X =
1
2pie
2
∑n
j=1
1
n log [2pief0(λj)] 2±4 log e
√
1
M ln
2n
 . (C11)
Similarly, we obtain an estimate of the signal variance σ2 by exploiting the relation
σ2 =
∫ 2pi
0
dλ
2pi
f(λ) , (C12)
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from which we derive a confidence interval
σ2 '
(
1± 4
√
1
M
ln
2n

)
n∑
j=1
1
n
f0(λj) . (C13)
Along the same lines we obtain a confidence interval for the conditional noise variance, σU ∈ [σ−U , σ+U ] (this must
additionally includes systematic errors). To obtain a worst-case estimate of the min-entropy we consider the smaller
value for the signal variance, σ−X , and the larger one for the noise, σ
+
U .
Appendix D: Characterization of vacuum fluctuations power spectral density
Here, we open up the homodyne detector black box and show by including imperfections that the bound given in
the main text is indeed a lower bound on the vacuum fluctuations. As described in the main text we beat two lasers,
the local oscillator with power PLO and an auxiliary signal laser with power Psig which is frequency detuned with
respect to the local oscillator by ν. The beams interfere at a beam splitter with splitting ratio R(ν) : 1−R(ν), where
the frequency dependence ν accounts for a frequency dependent common mode rejection of the homodyne electronics.
We furthermore take into consideration the visibility of the interference χ ∈ (0, 1] and the quantum efficiencies η1 and
η2 ∈ (0, 1] of the two photo diodes.
After photo detection and current subtraction the beat signal current at time t reads
ibeat(t) = 2χ
2(η1 + η2)
√
R(ν)(1−R(ν)) e
~ω
√
PLOPsig cos(2piνt) . (D1)
Here ω is the absolute angular frequency of the local oscillator laser. The square of the root mean square (RMS)
amplitude of the beat signal digitized by an analog-to-digital (ADC) converter as obtained by a power spectrum of
acquired samples is then given by
T˜F(ν) :=
(√
2χ2(η1 + η2)
√
R(ν)(1−R(ν)) e
~ω
)2
PLOPsigG(ν) , (D2)
where G(ν) describes the overall gain of homodyne detector, possible filters and ADC analog input as well as includes
the digitization into integers. We call TF := T˜F/Psig the transfer function.
The power spectral density (PSD) of the vacuum fluctuations after photo detection and digitization reads
PSDvac = 2e(idc1 + idc2)G(ν) = 2
e2
~ω
(η1(1−R(ν)) + η2R(ν))PLOG(ν) , (D3)
where idc1 and idc2 are the direct photo currents generated by the photo diodes. Using the characterization of the
transfer function from Eq. (D2) yields
PSDvac = ~ω
1
χ2
η1(1−R(ν)) + η2R(ν)
(η1 + η2)2R(ν)(1−R(ν))
T˜F(ν)
Psig
≥ ~ω T˜F(ν)
Psig
. (D4)
In the last step we lower bounded the PSD of the vacuum fluctuations by using 1/χ ≥ 1 and
(η1(1−R(ν)) + η2R(ν)) /
(
(η1 + η2)
2R(ν)(1−R(ν))) ≥ 1 , (D5)
where equality holds for η1 = η2 = 1, R = 0.5.
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